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Abstract
Motivated by peer-to-peer (P2P) networks and content delivery applications, we study Capacitated
Selfish Replication (CSR) games, which involve nodes on a network making strategic choices regarding
the content to replicate in their caches. Selfish replication games were introduced in [6], who analyzed
the uncapacitated case leaving the capacitated version as an open direction.
In this work, we study pure Nash equilibria of CSR games with an emphasis on hierarchical net-
works, which have been extensively used to model the communication costs of content delivery and P2P
systems. The best result from previous work on CSR games for hierarchical networks [21, 27] is the ex-
istence of a Nash equilibrium for a (slight generalization of a) 1-level hierarchy when the utility function
is based on the sum of the costs of accessing the replicated objects in the network. Our main result is an
exact polynomial-time algorithm for finding a Nash Equilibrium in any hierarchical network using a new
technique which we term “fictional players”. We show that this technique extends to a general frame-
work of natural preference orders, orders that are entirely arbitrary except for two natural constraints -
“Nearer is better” and “Independence of irrelevant alternatives”. This axiomatic treatment captures a vast
class of utility functions and even allows for nodes to simultaneously have utility functions of completely
different functional forms.
Using our axiomatic framework, we next study CSR games on arbitrary networks and delineate the
boundary between intractability and effective computability in terms of the network structure, object
preferences, and the total number of objects. In addition to hierarchical networks, we show the existence
of equilibria for general undirected networks when either object preferences are binary or there are two
objects. For general CSR games, however, we show that it is NP-hard to determine whether equilibria
exist. We also show that the existence of equilibria in strongly connected networks with two objects
and binary object preferences can be determined in polynomial time via a reduction to the well-studied
even-cycle problem. Finally, we introduce a fractional version of CSR games (F-CSR) with application
to content distribution using erasure codes. We show that while every F-CSR game instance possesses
an equilibrium, finding an equilibrium in an F-CSR game is PPAD-complete.
∗Gopalakrishnan and Karuturi were partially supported by a generous gift from Northeastern University alumnus Madhav
Anand. This work was also partially supported by NSF grants CCF-0635119 and CNS-0915985.
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1 Introduction
Consider a P2P movie sharing service where you need to decide which movies to store locally, given your
limited disk space, and which to obtain from your friends. Note that your decisions affect those of your
friends, who in turn take actions that affect you. A natural question arises: what is the prognosis for you
and your network of friends in terms of the stability of your movie collections and the satisfaction you will
derive from them? Similarly, in the brave new wireless world of 4G you will not only be a consumer of
different apps, you (your personal communications and computing device) will also be a provider of apps to
others around you. And the question arises: could this lead to a situation of endless churn (in terms of what
apps to store) or could there be an equilibrium?
In this paper, we study Capacitated Selfish Replication (CSR) Games, which provide an abstraction of
the above scenarios. These are games in which the strategic agents, or players, are nodes in a network. The
nodes have object preferences as well as bounded storage space – caches – in which they can store copies
of the content. Each node cooperates with other nodes by serving their requests to access objects stored in
its cache. However, the set of objects that a node chooses to store in its cache is entirely based on its own
utility function and where objects of interest have been stored in the network.
Such a game-theoretic framework was first introduced by Chun et al [6], who analyzed pure Nash equi-
libria in a setting with storage costs but no cache capacities, and left the capacitated version as an open
direction. Recent work on CSR games has focused on hierarchical networks, which have been extensively
used to model the communication costs of content delivery and P2P systems. (For instance, see the seminal
work of [14] that uses the ultrametric model for content delivery networks and the work of of [22, 16, 17, 32]
on cooperative caching in hierarchical networks.) The best result from previous work on CSR games for
hierarchical networks [21, 27] is the existence of a Nash equilibrium for (a slight generalization of) a one-
level hierarchical network using the sum utility function, i.e., when the utility of each node is based on a
weighted sum of the cost of accessing the objects.
1.1 Our results
This paper studies the existence and computability of Nash equilibria for several variants of CSR games,
with a particular focus on hierarchical networks. As with earlier studies [6, 21, 27, 1], we focus on the case
where all pieces of content have the same size; note that otherwise even computing the best response of a
player (node) is a generalization of the well-known knapsack problem and is NP-hard.
• Our main result is a polynomial-time algorithm for finding a Nash equilibrium for CSR games in
any hierarchical network, thus resolving the question left open by [19, 20, 27]. Our algorithm, pre-
sented in Section 3, is based on a new technique that we call the method of “fictional players1” where
we introduce and eliminate fictional players iteratively in a controlled fashion, maintaining a Nash
equilibrium at each step, until the end when we have the desired equilibrium for the entire network
(without any fictional players).
The above result is presented specifically in the context of the sum utility function to elucidate the
technique of fictional players. We then abstract the central requirements for our proof technique and develop
a general axiomatic framework which allows us to extend our results to a large class of utility functions.
• We present, in Section 4, a general framework for CSR games involving utility preference relations
and node preference orders. Rather than specifying a numerical utility assigned by each node to each
placement of objects, we only require that the preference order each node has on object placements
1not to be confused with “fictitious play” [10] which involves learning
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Object preferences and count Undirected networks Directed networks
Binary, two objects Yes, in P (5.3) No, in P (6.2)
Binary, three or more objects Yes, in PLS (5.2) No, NP-complete (6.1)
General, two objects Yes, in P (5.3) No, NP-complete (6.1)
General, three or more objects No, NP-complete (6.1) No, NP-complete (6.1)
Hierarchical: Yes, in P (5.1)
Table 1: Existence and computability of equilibria in CSR games. Each cell (other than in the first row or the first
column) first indicates whether equilibria always exist in the particular sub-class of CSR games. If equilibria always
exist, then the cell next indicates the complexity of determining an equilibrium; otherwise, it indicates the complexity
of determining whether equilibria exist for a given instance. The relevant subsection is given in parentheses.
satisfy two natural constraints of Monotonicity (or “Nearer is better”) and Consistency (or “Indepen-
dence of irrelevant alternatives”). This axiomatic treatment captures a vast class of utility functions
and even allows for nodes to simultaneously have utility functions of completely different functional
forms.
• We extend our result for hierarchical networks to the broader class of utilities allowed by the axiomatic
framework, and then study general CSR games obtained by considering different network structures
(directed or undirected) and different forms of object preferences (binary or general). We delineate
the boundary between intractability and effective computability of equilibria in terms of the network
structure, object preferences, and the total number of objects. These results are presented in Sections 5
and 6 and summarized in Table 1. Notable results include: (1) the existence of equilibria for undirected
networks with two objects that also utilizes the technique of fictional players, (2) the existence of
equilibria for undirected networks when object preferences are binary, and (3) the equivalence of
finding equilibria in CSR games with two objects and binary object preferences to the well-studied
even-cycle problem [29].
Our last set of results concerns fractional CSR (F-CSR) games, where each node is allowed to store
fractions of objects. In our framework, a node can satisfy an object access request by retrieving any set of
fractions of the object as long as these fractions sum to at least one. As we discuss in Section 7, a natural
implementation of this framework is via erasure codes (e.g., using the Digital Fountain approach [4, 31]).
• We show that F-CSR games always have equilibria, and the problem of finding an equilibrium is in
PPAD. We also show, however, that finding equilibria is PPAD-hard even for a sum-of-distances
utility function.
1.2 Related work
In the last decade there has been a tremendous flowering of research at the intersection of game theory
and computer science [24]. In a seminal paper [26] Papadimitriou laid the groundwork for algorithmic
game theory by introducing syntactically defined subclasses of FNP with complete problems, PPAD being
a notable such subclass. Recently, in a major breakthrough 2-player Nash Equilibrium was shown to be
PPAD-complete [7, 5]. The term PPAD-complete is coming to occupy a role in algorithmic game theory
analogous to the term NP-complete in combinatorial optimization [11].
Selfish caching games were introduced in [6] who considered the uncapacitated case where nodes could
store more pieces of content by paying for the additional storage. We believe that limits on cache-capacity
model an important real-world restriction and hence our focus on the capacitated version which was left as
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an open direction by [6]. Special cases of the integral version of CSR games have been studied. In [21],
Nash equilibria were shown to exist for when nodes are equidistant from one another and a special server
holds all objects. [27] slightly extends [21] to the case where special servers for different objects are at
different distances. Our results generalize and completely subsume all these prior cases of CSR games. The
Market sharing games defined by [12] also consider caches with capacity, but are of a very special kind;
unlike CSR games, market sharing games are a special case of congestion games. In this work we focus
primarily on equilibria and our general axiomatic framework has the flavor of similar frameworks from the
theory of social choice [2]; in this sense, we deviate from prior work [9, 8] that is focused on the price of
anarchy [18].
There has been considerable research on capacitated caching, viewed as an optimization problem. Vari-
ous centralized and distributed algorithms have been presented for different networks in [1, 3, 22, 16, 33].
2 A basic model for CSR games
We consider a network consisting of a set V of nodes labeled 1 through n = |V | sharing a collection O of
unit-size objects. For any i and j in V , let dij denote the cost incurred at i for accessing an object at j; we
refer to d as the access cost function. We say that j is node i’s nearest node in a set S of nodes if j is in
S and dij ≤ dik for all k in S. We say that the given network is undirected if d is symmetric; that is, if
dij = dji for all i, j in V . We call an undirected network hierarchical if the access cost function forms an
ultrametric; that is, if dik ≤ max{dij , djk} for all i, j, k ∈ V .
Each node i has a cache to store a certain number of objects. The placement at a node i is simply the
set of objects stored at i. The strategy set of a given node is the set of all feasible placements at the node.
A global placement is any tuple (Pi : i ∈ V ), where Pi ⊆ O represents a feasible placement at node i. For
convenience, we use P−i to denote the collection (Pj : j ∈ V \ {i}), thus often using P = (Pi, P−i) to
refer to a global placement. We also assume that V includes a (server) node that has the capacity to store all
objects. This ensures that at least one copy of every object is present in the system; this assumption can be
made without loss of generality since we can set the access cost of every node to this server to be arbitrarily
large.
CSR Games. In our game-theoretic model, each node attaches a utility to each global placement. We
assume that each node i has a weight ri(α) for each object α representing the rate at which i accesses α.
We define the sum utility function Us(i) as follows: Us(i)(P ) = −
∑
α∈O ri(α) · diσi(P,α), where σi(P, α)
is i’s nearest node holding α in P .
A CSR game is a tuple (V,O, d, {ri}). Our focus is on pure Nash equilibria (henceforth, simply equi-
libria) of the CSR games we define. An equilibrium for a CSR game instance is a global placement P such
that for each i ∈ V there is no placement Qi such that Us(i)(P ) > Us(i)(Q).
Unit cache capacity. In this paper, we assume that all objects are of identical size. Under this assumption,
we now argue that it is sufficient to consider the case where each node’s cache holds exactly one object.
Consider a set V of nodes in which the cache of node i can store ci objects. Let V ′ denote a new set of
nodes which contains, for each node i in V , new nodes i1, i2, . . . , ici , i.e., one new node for each unit of
the cache capacity of i. We extend the access cost function as follows: dj`ik = dji for all 1 ≤ ` ≤ cj ,
1 ≤ k ≤ ci.
We consider an obvious onto mapping f from placements in V ′ to those in V . Given placement P ′ for
V ′, we set f(P ′) = P where Pi = ∪1≤k≤ciP ′ik . This mapping ensures that Us(i)(P ′) = Us(i)(P ), giving
us the desired reduction. Thus, in the remainder of the paper, we assume that every node in the network
stores at most one object in its cache.
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3 Hierarchical networks
In this section, we give a polynomial-time construction of equilibria for CSR games on hierarchical net-
works. Any hierarchical network can be represented by a tree T whose set of leaves is the node set V and
every internal node v has a label `(v) such that (a) if v is an ancestor2 of w in T , then `(v) ≥ `(w), and (b)
for any i, j in V , dij is given by `(lca(i, j)), where lca(i, j) denotes the least common ancestor of nodes i
and j [14, 16].
Fictional players. In order to present our algorithm, we introduce the notion of a fictional player. For an
object α, a fictional α-player is a new node that stores α in any equilibrium; for any fictional α-player `,
r`(α) is 1 and r`(β) is 0 for any β 6= α. Each fictional player is introduced as a leaf in the current hierarchy;
the exact locations in the hierarchy are determined by our algorithm. The access cost function is naturally
extended to the fictional players using the hierarchy and the labels of the internal nodes. In the following,
we use “node” to refer to both the elements of V and fictional players.
A preference relation. The hierarchical network and the weights that nodes have for different objects
induce, for each node i, a natural preorder wi among elements of O × Ai, where Ai is the set of proper
ancestors of i in T . Specifically, we define (α, v) Ai (β,w) whenever ri(α) · `(v) > ri(β) · `(w). We
can now express the best response of any player directly in terms of these preference relations. We define
µi(P ) = (α, v) where Pi = {α} and v is lca(i, σi(P−i, α)), where σi(P−i, α) denotes i’s nearest node in
the set of nodes holding α in P−i.
Lemma 1. A best response Pi of a node i for a placement P−i of V \ {i} is {α} where α maximizes
(γ, lca(i, σi(P−i, γ))), over all objects γ, according to wi.
Proof. For a given placement P with Pi = {α}, Us(i)(P ) equals−
∑
γ 6=α ri(γ)`(lca(i, σi(P−i, γ))), which
can be rewritten as −(∑γ∈O ri(γ)`(lca(i, σi(P−i, γ)))) + ri(α) · `(lca(i, σi(P−i, α))). Thus, {α} is a best
response to P−i if and only if α maximizes ri(γ) · `(lca(i, σi(P−i, γ)) over all objects γ. The desired claim
follows from the definition of wi.
The algorithm. We introduce several fictional players at the start of the algorithm. We maintain the invariant
that the current global placement is an equilibrium in the current hierarchy. As the algorithm proceeds, the
set of fictional players and their locations change as we remove existing fictional players or add new ones.
On termination, there are no fictional players leaving us with a desired equilibrium. Let Wt and P t denote
the set of fictional players and equilibrium, respectively, at the start of step t of the algorithm.
Initialization. We add, for each object α and for each internal node v of T , a fictional α-player as a leaf
child of v; this constitutes the set W0. The initial equilibrium P 0 is defined as follows: for each fictional
α-player i, we have P 0i = {α}; each node i in V plays its best response. Clearly, each fictional player is in
equilibrium, by definition. Furthermore, for every α, every i in V has a sibling fictional α-player. Thus, the
best response of every i in V is independent of the placement of nodes in V \ {i}, implying that P 0 is an
equilibrium.
Step t of algorithm. Fix an equilibrium P t for the node set V ∪Wt. If Wt is empty, then we are done.
Otherwise, select a node j in Wt. Let P tj = {α}, and let µj(P t) = (α, v). Let S denote the set of all nodes
i ∈ V such that (α, v) Ai µi(P t). We now describe how to compute a new set of fictional players Wt+1 and
a new global placement P t+1 such that P t+1 is an equilibrium for V ∪Wt+1. We consider two cases.
• S is empty: Remove the fictional player j from Wt and the hierarchy, and leave the placement in the
remaining nodes as before. Thus Wt+1 = Wt − {j} and P t+1 is the same as P t except that P t+1j is
no longer defined.
2We adopt the convention that each node is both descendant and ancestor of itself.
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• S is nonempty: Select a node i in S such that lca(i, j) is lowest among all nodes in S. Let P ti = {β}.
We set P t+1i = {α}, remove the fictional α-player j from Wt, and add a new fictional β-player `
as a leaf sibling of i in T ; i.e., P t+1` = {β}. For every other node j, set P t+1j = P tj . Finally, set
Wt+1 = (Wt ∪ {k}) \ {j}.
v
u
y
x
iβ α j
Figure 1: Illustrating the algorithm for hierarchical networks; the square is a node i in V holding object β, and the
hexagon is a fictional α-player.
Lemma 2. Consider step t of the algorithm. If P t is an equilibrium for V ∪Wt, then the following statements
hold.
1. For every node k in V ∪Wt+1, P t+1k is a best response to P t+1−k .
2. For every node k in V ∪Wt+1, µk(P t+1) wk µk(P t).
3. We have |Wt+1| ≤ |Wt|. Furthermore, either |Wt+1| < |Wt| or there exists a node i in V such that
µi(P
t+1) Ai µi(P t).
Proof. Let α, v, S, i, and j be as defined in step t of the algorithm above, and illustrated in Figure 1. We
first establish statements 1 and 2 of the lemma. Let k be any node in V ∪Wt+1. Consider first the case
where lca(k, j) is an ancestor of v (i.e., k is not in the subtree rooted at the child u of v that contains j). For
any object γ, we have σk(P t+1−k , γ) = σk(P
t
−k, γ) and P
t+1
k = P
t
k. It thus follows that µk(P
t+1) = µk(P
t),
implying statement 2 for k. Since P t is in equilibrium, statement 1 also holds for k.
We next establish statements 1 and 2 for any node k where lca(k, j) is a proper descendant of v (i.e., k
is in the subtree rooted at the child u of v that contains j). We consider two cases. The first case is where
S is empty. In this case, the fictional α-player j is removed; thus j is not in Wt+1. Furthermore, there is no
copy of α in the subtree rooted at u. Since no object other than α is created or removed in this case, we have
σk(P
t+1
−k , γ) = σk(P
t
−k, γ) for γ 6= α. We also have lca(k, σk(P t+1−k , α)) = v and µk(P t+1) = µk(Pt), the
latter establishing statement 2 for k. Since S is empty, µk(P t) wk (α, v). It follows from Lemma 1 and the
fact that P tk is in equilibrium that P
t+1
k is a best response against P
t+1
−k , establishing statement 1 for k.
The second case is where S is not empty. Let i be as defined above, i.e., i is a node in S such that
lca(i, j) is lowest among all nodes in S. Let x denote lca(i, j). Let P ti be equal to {β}, where β 6= α.
By the algorithm, we have P t+1k = {α}. Let k 6= i be a node in the subtree rooted at u. For any γ 6=
α, σk(P t+1−k , γ) = σk(P
t+1
−k , γ). Since P
t+1
k = P
t
k 6= {α}, we have µk(P t+1) = µk(P t), establishing
statement 2 for k. For node i, we have µi(P t+1) = (α, v) Ai µi(P t), establishing statement 2 for i.
It remains to establish statement 1 for any node k in the subtree rooted at u. We again separate into two
cases. Let y be the child of x that is an ancestor of j (see Figure 1(c)). In the first case, we let k be in the
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subtree rooted at y. Then, by our choice of i, we have
µk(P
t+1) wk (α, v) wk (α, x) = (α, σk(P t+1−k , α)),
which, by Lemma 1, implies that statement 1 holds for k. In the second case, we let k be in the subtree
rooted at u but not in the subtree rooted at y. Again, σk(P t+1−k , γ) = σk(P
t
−k, γ) for γ 6= α. And for α we
have
(α, lca(k, σk(P t+1−k , α))) = (α, lca(k, i)) wk (α, x) wk µk(P t) = µk(P t+1),
establishing statement 1 for k using Lemma 1.
We finally establish statement 3 of the lemma. The fact |Wt+1| ≤ |Wt| is immediate from the definition
of step t of the algorithm. When S is empty, |Wt+1| < |Wt| since a fictional player is deleted. When S is
nonempty, we have shown above that µi(P t+1) Ai µi(P t), thus completing the proof for statement 3 and
for the whole lemma.
Theorem 3. For hierarchical node preferences, an equilibrium can be found in polynomial time.
Proof. It is immediate from the definition of the algorithm and Lemma 2 that at termination, the algorithm
returns a valid equilibrium. It remains to show that our algorithm terminates in polynomial time. Consider
the potential given by the sum of |Wt| and the sum, over all i, of the position of µi(P t) in the preorder wi.
The term |W0| is at most nm, where n is |V | (which is at least the number of internal nodes) and m is the
number of objects. Furthermore, since |O× I| is at most nm, the initial potential is at most nm+ n2m. By
Lemma 2, the potential decreases by at least one in each step of the algorithm. Thus, the number of steps of
the algorithm is at most nm+ n2m.
We now show that each step of the algorithm can be implemented in polynomial time. The initialization
consists of adding the O(nm) fictional players and computing the best response for each node i in V ;
the latter task involves, for each k in V , comparing at most m placements (one for each object). Each
subsequent step of the algorithm involves the selection of a fictional player j, determination whether the
set S is nonempty, and if so, computation of the node i, and then updating the placement. The only parts
that need explanation are the computation of S and i – S is simply the set of all nodes k that are not in
equilibrium when fictional player j is deleted. We compute S as follows: for each node k in V , if replacing
the current object in their cache by α yields a more preferable placement (according to the utility) then add k
to S. Thus, S can be computed in time polynomial in n. The node i is simply a node in S such that lca(i, j)
is lowest among all nodes in S, and can be computed in time polynomial in n. This completes the proof of
the theorem.
4 A general axiomatic framework for CSR games
We now present a new axiomatic framework which generalizes the result of Section 3 to a broad class of
utility functions, and also enables us to study the existence and complexity of equilibria in more general
settings.
Node preference relations. We assume that each node i in V has a total preorder ≥i among all the nodes
in V 3; ≥i further satisfies i ≥i j for all i, j ∈ V . We say that a node i prefers j over k if j ≥i k, and call a
node j most i-preferred in a set S of nodes if j is in S and j ≥i k for all k in S. We also use the notation
j =i k whenever j ≥i k and k ≥i j, and j >i k whenever it is not the case that k ≥i j. Note that >i is
3A total preorder is a binary relation that satisfies reflexivity, transitivity, and totality. Totality means that for any i, j, k, either
j ≥i k or k ≥i j.
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a strict weak order4, and for any i, j, and k, we have exactly one of these three relations holding: j >i k,
k >i j, k =i j. We also extend the notation σi(P, α) and σi(P−i, α) denote a most i-preferred node holding
α in P and P−i, respectively, breaking ties arbitrarily.
The access cost function d introduced in Section 2 induces a natural node preference relation: j >i k
if dij < dik, and j =i k if dij = dik. In fact, as we show in Lemma 4, undirected networks (i.e., when
the access cost function is symmetric) are equivalent to acyclic node preference collections. Formally, the
collection {≥i: i ∈ V } is an acyclic node preference collection if there does not exist a sequence of nodes
i0, i1, . . . , ik−1 for an integer k ≥ 3 such that i(j−1) mod k >ij i(j+1) mod k for all 0 ≤ j < k.
Lemma 4. Any undirected network yields an acyclic node preference collection. For any acyclic node
preference collection, we can compute, in polynomial time, symmetric cost functions that are consistent with
the node preferences.
Proof. Let d denote a symmetric access cost function over the set V of nodes. For a given node i ∈ V ,
we have j ≥i k iff dij ≤ dik. We now argue that the collection {≥i: i ∈ V } is acyclic. Suppose, for the
sake of contradiction, that there exists a sequence of nodes i0, i1, . . . , ik−1 for an integer k ≥ 3 such that
i(j−1) mod k >ij i(j+1) mod k for all 0 ≤ j < k. It then follows that:
diji(j−1) mod k < diji(j+1) mod k for 0 ≤ j < k.
Since d is symmetric, we obtain
diji(j−1) mod k < di(j+1) mod kij for 0 ≤ j < k,
which is a contradiction.
Given an acyclic collection of node preferences, we compute an associated access cost function d in
polynomial time as follows. We construct a directed graph G over the set U of all unordered pairs (i, j) :
i, j ∈ V , i 6= j. There is a directed edge from node (i, j) to (i, k) if and only if k ≥i j. Since the collection
{≥i: i ∈ V } is acyclic, G is a dag. We compute the topological ordering pi : U → Z; thus, we have
pi((i, j)) < pi((k, `)) whenever there is a directed path from (i, j) to (k, `). Setting dij to be pi((i, j)) gives
us the desired undirected network.
Utility preference relations. In our game-theoretic model, each node attaches a utility to each global
placement. We present a general definition that allows us to consider a large class of utility functions
simultaneously. Rather than define a numerical utility function, we present the utility at each node i as a
total preorder i among the set of all global placements. (The notation i and =i over global placements
are defined analogously.) We require that i, for each i ∈ V , satisfies the following two basic conditions.
• Monotonicity: For any two global placements P and Q, if, for each object α and each node q with
α ∈ Qq, there exists a node p with α ∈ Pp and p ≥i q, then P i Q.
• Consistency: Let (Pi, P−i) and (Qi, Q−i) denote two global placements such that for each object
α ∈ Pi ∪ Qi, if p (resp., q) is a most i-preferred node in V \ {i} holding α, i.e., α ∈ Pp (resp.,
α ∈ Qq), then p =i q. If (Pi, P−i) i (Qi, P−i), then (Pi, Q−i) i (Qi, Q−i).
In words, the monotonicity condition says that for any node, if all the objects in a placement are placed at
nodes that are at least as preferred as in another placement, then the node prefers the former placement at
least as much as the latter. The consistency condition says that the preference for a node to store one set of
4A strict weak order is a strict partial order > (a transitive relation that is irreflexive) in which the relation “neither a > b nor
b > a” is transitive. Strict weak orders and total preorders are widely used in microeconomics.
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objects instead of another is entirely a function of the set of most preferred other nodes that together hold
these objects. For instance, if a node i with unit capacity prefers to store α over β in a scenario where the
most i-preferred node (other than i) storing α (resp., β) is j (resp., k), then i prefers to store α at least as
much as β in any other situation where the most i-preferred node (other than i) storing α (resp., β) is j
(resp., k).
Generality of the conditions. We note that many standard utility functions defined for replica placement
problems [6, 20, 27], including the sum and max functions, satisfy the monotonicity and consistency con-
ditions. Indeed, any utility function that is an Lp norm, for any p, over the costs for the individual objects,
also satisfies the conditions. Furthermore, since the monotonicity and consistency conditions apply to the
individual utility functions, our model allows the different nodes to adopt different types of utilities, as long
as each separately satisfies the two conditions.
Binary object preferences. One class of utility preference relations that we highlight is the ones based on
binary object preferences. Suppose that each node i has a set Si of objects in which it is equally interested,
and it has no interest in the other objects. Let τi(P ) denote the |Si|-length sequence consisting of the
σi(P, α), for α ∈ Si, in nonincreasing order according to the relation ≥i. Then, the consistency condition
can be further strengthened to the following.
• Binary Consistency: For any placements P = (Pi, P−i) and Q = (Qi, Q−i) with P−i = Q−i, we
have P i Q if and only if for 1 ≤ k ≤ |Si|, the kth component of τi(P ) is at least as i-preferred as
the kth component of τi(Q).
CSR Games. In the general framework, a CSR game is a tuple (V,O, {≥i}, {i}). A (pure) Nash equilib-
rium for an CSR game instance is a global placement P such that for each i ∈ V there is no placement Qi
such that (Qi, P−i) i (Pi, P−i).
For our complexity results, we need to give the specification for a given game instance. The set V
is specified, together with node cache capacities, and O is an enumerated list of object names. The node
preference relation ≥i is specified succinctly by a set of at most
(
n
2
)
bits, for each i. The utility preference
relation i, however, is over a potentially exponential number of placements (in terms of n, m, and cache
sizes). For our complexity results, we assume that the utility preference relations are specified by an effi-
cient algorithm – which we call the utility preference oracle – that takes as input a node i, and two global
placements P and Q, and returns whether P i Q. For the sum, max, and Lp-norm utilities, the utility
preference oracle simply computes the relevant utility function. For binary object preferences, the binary
consistency condition yields an oracle that is polynomial in number of nodes, objects, and cache sizes.
Unit cache capacity. We now argue that the unit cache capacity assumption of Section 2 continues to hold
without loss of generality. Consider a set V of nodes in which the cache of node i can store ci objects. Let
V ′ denote a new set of nodes which contains, for each node i in V , new nodes i1, i2, . . . , ici , i.e., one new
node for each unit of the cache capacity of i. We set the node preferences as follows: for all i, i′, j ∈ V ,
1 ≤ f, ` ≤ cj , 1 ≤ k, k′ ≤ ci, we have ik ≥j` i′k′ whenever i ≥j i′, and jf =ik j`.
We consider an obvious onto mapping f from placements in V ′ to those in V . Given placement P ′
for V ′, we set f(P ′) = P where Pi = ∪1≤k≤ciP ′ik . This mapping naturally defines the utility preference
relations for the node set V ′. In particular, for any i ∈ V and 1 ≤ k ≤ ci, P ′ ik Q′ whenever f(P ′) i
f(Q′). We also note that f is computable in time polynomial in the number of nodes and the sum of the
cache capacities. It is easy to verify that the utility preference relation ik for all ik ∈ V ′ satisfies the
monotonicity and consistency conditions. Furthermore, P ′ is an equilibrium for V ′ if and only if f(P ′) is
an equilibrium for V ; this together with the onto property of the mapping f gives us the desired reduction.
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5 Existence of equilibria in the general framework
In this section, we establish the existence of equilibria for several CSR games under the axiomatic frame-
work of Section 4. We first extend our result for the sum utility function on hierarchical networks to the
general framework (Section 5.1). We next show that CSR games for undirected networks and binary object
preferences are potential games (Section 5.2). Finally, when there are only two objects in the system, we
use the technique of fictional players to give a polynomial-time construction of equilibria for CSR games
for undirected networks (Section 5.3).
5.1 Hierarchical networks
We now show that the polynomial time algorithm of Section 3 extends to the axiomatic framework we have
introduced. In the general framework, a hierarchical network can be represented as a tree T whose set of
leaves is the node set V and the node preference relation ≥i given by: j ≥i k if lca(i, j) is a descendant
of lca(i, k). Our algorithm of Section 3 and its analysis are completely determined by the structure of the
hierarchical network and the pair-preference relations wi defined for each node i; the latter were defined
for the sum utility function. In order to extend our analysis to the general framework, it suffices to derive a
new preference relation and establish the analogue of Lemma 1, which we now present for arbitrary utility
preference relations satisfying the monotonicity and consistency properties.
Pair preference relations. Given any utility preference relation i that satisfies the monotonicity and
consistency conditions, we define a strict weak order Ai on O×Ai, where Ai is the set of proper ancestors
of i in T .
1. For each object α, node i, and proper ancestors v and w of i, we have (α, v) Ai (α,w) whenever v is
a proper ancestor of w.
2. Consider distinct objects α, β and nodes i, j, k with j, k 6= i. LetP denote the set of global placements
P such that j (resp., k) is a most i-preferred node in V \ {i} holding α (resp., β) in P−i. If there exist
global placements P = ({α}, P−i) and Q = ({β}, P−i) in P with P i Q, then (α, lca(i, j)) Ai
(β, lca(i, k)).
In words, item 1 says that i’s preference for keeping α in its cache increases as the most i-preferred
node holding α becomes less preferred (or “moves farther away”). In item 2, (α, v) Ai (β,w) means that
if i needs to place either α or β in its cache, and the least common ancestor of i and the most i-preferred
node in V \ {i} holding α (resp., β) is v (resp., w), then i prefers to store α over β. The strict weak order
Ai induces a total preorder wi as follows: (α, v) wi (β,w) if it is not the case that (β, v) Ai (α,w). We
similarly define =i: (α, v) =i (β,w) if (α, v) wi (β,w) and (β, v) =i (α,w).
Lemma 5. For each i, Ai as given above, is a well-defined strict weak order.
Proof. We need to ensure the well-definedness of part 2 of the definition of pair preference relations. That
is, we need to show that for any placements P−i and Q−i such that a most i-preferred node in P−i hold-
ing α (resp., β) is also a most i-preferred node in Q−i, it is impossible that ({α}, P−i) i ({β}, P−i)
and ({β}, Q−i) i ({α}, Q−i) both hold. This directly follows from the consistency condition for utility
preference relations.
The reflexivity and transitivity of wi are immediate from the definitions and the reflexivity and tran-
sitivity of i. Finally, to ensure the well-definedness of the strict preorder Ai, we also have to show
that there is no collection of pairs (αj , vj), 0 ≤ j < ` for some integer ` > 1, such that (αj , vj) Ai
(αj+1 mod `, vj+1 mod `) for 0 ≤ j < `. To see this, it is sufficient to note that if (α, v) Ai (α′, v′) then for
all placements P and P ′ such that P−i = P ′−i and the least common ancestor of i and the most i-preferred
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node in V \ {i} that holds α (resp., α′) is v (resp., v′) we have P i P ′. So any cycle in the strict preorder
Ai implies a cycle in i, yielding a contradiction.
Lemma 6. For any global placement P = ({α}, P−i), if j (resp., k) is a most i-preferred node holding
object α (resp., β) in P−i, and ({β}, P−i) i ({α}, P−i), i.e., for node i, storing β is a better response to
P−i than storing α, then (β, lca(i, k)) Ai (α, lca(i, j)). Futhermore, for any global placement P , {α} is a
best response to P−i, where α maximizes (γ, lca(i, σi(P−i, γ))), over all objects γ, according to wi.
Proof. The first statement of the lemma directly follows from item 2 of the definition of pair preference
relations. We establish the second statement by contradiction. Suppose that for node i, {β} is a better
response to P−i than {α}. Then, we have ({β}, P−i) i ({α}, P−i), which, by item 2 of the definition of
pair preference relations, implies that (β, lca(i, σi(P−i, β))) Ai (α, lca(i, σi(P−i, α))), a contradiction to
the choice of α.
The remainder of the analysis for hierarchical networks (Lemma 2 and Theorem 3) follows as before,
invoking Lemma 6 instead of Lemma 1.
5.2 Undirected networks with binary object preferences
Let d be a symmetric cost function for an undirected network over the node set V . Recall that for binary
object preferences, we are given, for each node i a set Si of objects in which i is equally interested. Our
proof of existence of equilibria is via a potential function argument. Given a placement P , let Φi(P ) = dij ,
where j is the most i-preferred node in V −{i} holding the object in Pi. We introduce the potential function
Φ: Φ(P ) = (Φ0,Φi1(P ),Φi2(P ), . . . ,Φin(P )), where Φ0 is the number of nodes i such that Pi ⊆ Si, and
Φij (P ) ≤ Φij+1(P ), ∀j, where V = {i1, i2, . . . , in}. We prove that Φ is an increasing potential function:
after any better response step, Φ increases in lexicographical order.
Let P = (Pi, P−i) be an arbitrary global placement. Assume that Pi = {α} and j is the most i-
preferred node in P−i holding α. Consider any better response step, from placement P to Q = (Qi, P−i),
where Qi = {β}. Clearly β ∈ Si. We consider two cases. First, suppose α /∈ Si and β ∈ Si. Then, Φ0
increases, and so does the potential. The second case is where α, β ∈ Si. Let k be the most i-preferred
node in P−i holding β. In this case, Φ0 does not change. However, since this is a better response step of
i, j >i k, implying that dik > dij and hence Φi(Q) > Φi(P ). Consider any other node j. If j holds any
object γ other than β, since no new copy of γ has been added, Φj(Q) ≥ Φj(P ). It remains to consider the
case where j holds β. If S is the set of nodes in V \ {j} holding β in P−j , then S ∪ {i} is the set of nodes
in V \ {j} holding β. Thus, Φj(Q) = min{Φj(P ), dji} ≥ min{Φj(P ),Φi(Q)}. This also means that
Φj(P ) appears later in the sorted order than Φi(P ) and Φj(Q) appears no earlier in the sorted order than
Φi(Q). Hence, Φ(Q) is lexicographically greater than Φ(P ). This establishes that for undirected networks
with binary object preferences, the resulting CSR game is a potential game, and hence also in PLS [13].
5.3 Undirected networks with two objects
We give a polynomial-time algorithm for computing an equilibrium in any undirected network with two
objects. Our algorithm uses the fictional player technique introduced in Section 5.1. It starts by introducing
fictional players serving both the objects in the network at zero cost from each node. In each subsequent
step, we move the fictional players progressively “further” away, ensuring that each instant, we have an
equilibrium. Finally, when the fictional players are at least preferred cost from all the nodes, they can be
removed yielding an equilibrium for the original network.
Suppose we are given a undirected network with access cost function d. Also letD be the set {0, `1, `2, . . . , `r}
of all access costs between nodes in the system in increasing order; that is, `1 = mini,j dij and `r =
maxi,j dij and `i < `i+1 for all 1 ≤ i < r.
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Fictional player. For an object α, a fictional α-player is a new node that will store α in every equilibrium;
an fictional α-player prefers storing α over any other object. We denote by srvα(`) the fictional α-player
which is at access cost ` from every node in V .
The algorithm.
Initialization. Assuming that there are two objects α and β in the system, we initially set up a fictional
α-player srvα(0) and β-player srvβ(0) at access cost 0 from each node in V . We let nodes replicate their
most preferred object and access the other without any access cost from the corresponding fictional player.
This placement is obviously an equilibrium.
Step t of algorithm. Fix an equilibrium P for the node set V ∪ {srvα(`t)} ∪ {srvβ(`t)}. We describe one
step of the algorithm which computes a new set of fictional players srvα(`t+1) and srvβ(`t+1) and a new
placement P ′ such that P ′ is an equilibrium for the node set V ∪ {srvα(`t+1)} ∪ {srvβ(`t+1)}. We first
remove the α-player srvα(`t) from the system and instead we add srvα(`t+1). If there do not exist nodes
that want to deviate we are done. Otherwise, assume that there exists a node i that wants to deviate from
its strategy. Since the most i-preferred node holding β in V ∪ {srvα(`t)} ∪ {srvβ(`t)} remains the same
in V ∪ srvα(`t+1) ∪ srvβ(`t), i is not holding object α. Thus the only nodes that may want to deviate are
those that are holding object β. We argue that if we let i to deviate from β ∈ Pi to α ∈ P ′i , there is no node
j ∈ V \ {i} that gets affected by i’s deviation. Consider the following two cases:
• If a node j has access cost at most `t from i, then β ∈ Pj . Otherwise, if α ∈ Pj , srvα(`t) would not
be the most i-preferred node holding α and thus i would not be affected by any change of α-players.
Thus there does not exist any node j ∈ V \ {i} with access cost at most `t from i, such that α ∈ Pj ,
and as we showed above α ∈ P ′j .
• If a node j has access cost at least `t+1 from i, then Pj = P ′j . Because of the α-player srvα(`t+1)
and the β-player srvβ(`t), i would never be the j-most preferred node in P ′.
We then remove the β-player srvβ(`t) from the system and instead we add srvβ(`t+1). Using a similar
argument as above, we obtain a new equilibrium at the end of this step.
Theorem 7. For undirected networks with two objects, an equilibrium can be found in polynomial time.
Proof. An initial placement P , where we have the set of fictional players srvα(0) and srvβ(0) in the system,
is obviously an equilibrium. It is immediate from our argument above that at termination the algorithm
returns a valid equilibrium.
The size of the set D is at most (n2) which is at most n2. In each step t at most n nodes may want to
deviate from their strategy, since we showed above that if a node deviates once in a step, it will not deviate
again during the same step . Thus, the total number of deviations in the algorithm is at most n3.
6 Non-Existence of equilibria in CSR games and the associated decision
problem
In this section, we show that the classes of games studied in Section 5 are essentially the only games where
equilibria are guaranteed to exist. We identify the most basic CSR games where equilibria may not exist,
and study the complexity of the associated decision problem.
6.1 NP-Completeness
The main result of this section is the following theorem, which establishes the NP-hardness of determining
whether a given CSR game has an equilibrium even when the utility preference relations are based on the
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sum utility function and either the number of objects is small or the object preferences are binary. The proof
is by a polynomial-time reduction from 3SAT [11]. Each reduction is built on top of a gadget which has an
equilibrium if and only if a specified node holds a certain object. Several copies of these gadgets are then
put together to capture the given 3SAT formula.
Theorem 8. The problem of determining whether a given CSR instance has an equilibrium is in NP. It
is NP-hard to determine whether an CSR intance has an equilibrium even if one of these three restrictions
hold: (a) number of objects is two; (b) object preferences are binary and number of objects is three; (c)
network is undirected and number of objects is three.
The membership in NP is immediate, since one can determine in polynomial time whether a given global
placement is an equilibrium. The remainder of the proof focuses on the hardness reduction from 3SAT.
Given a 3SAT formula φ with n variables x1, x2, . . . , xn and k clauses c1, c2, . . . , ck, we construct an
CSR instance as follows. For each variable xi in φ, we introduce two variable nodes: node Xi and X¯i.
We set dXiX¯i and the symmetric dX¯iXi to be 0.5, where d is the underlying access cost function. For each
clause cj , we introduce a clause node Cj . Assuming that `j,r, for r ∈ {1, 2, 3} are the three literals of clause
cj in formula φ, we set dCjLj,r and dLj,rCj to be 1 for r ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Note that each Lj,s, for j ∈ [1, k], and
s ∈ {1, 2, 3} is in fact some variable node Xh or X¯h for some h ∈ [1, n]. We also introduce a gadget G
illustrated in Figure 3, consisting of nodes S, A, B, and C. We set the access cost dSCi and the symmetric
dCiS , for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k between node S and all clause nodes to be 2. The general construction is illustrated
in Figure 2.
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Directed networks with two objects. We set dAS , dAB , dBC , dCA to be 1. The server node at access cost
dsrv = 10 from all nodes in V , stores a fixed copy of two objects α and β. We set the weights rxi(α),
rx¯i(α), rxi(β), rx¯i(β) of each variable node on objects α and β, to be 1. For each clause node we set the
weight rCi(α) on object α to be 1, and the weight rCi(β) on object β to be 0.7, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k. We set
the weight rS(α) on object α to be 1, and the weight rS(β) on object β to be 0.7. We set the weight rA(α)
of node A on object α to be 0.7 and the weight rA(β) of node A on object β to be 1. Finally, we set the
weight of nodes B and C on both objects α, and β to be 1. We refer to this CSR instance as I1.
Undirected networks with three objects. For the undirected case, we set dAS and dBS to be 3, dAB to
be 3.1, dBC to be 3.05, and dCA to be 2; while symmetry holds. The server node, which is at access cost
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dsrv = 5 from all nodes in V , stores a fixed copy of three objects α, β, and γ. We set the weights rxi(α),
rx¯i(α), rxi(β), rx¯i(β) of each variable node on objects α and β, to be 1. Also, for each clause node we set
the weight rCi(α) on object α to be 0.85, and the weight rCi(β) on object β to be 1, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
We set the weight rS(α) on object α to be 0.85, and the weight rS(β) on object β to be 1. Also we set the
weight rA(α) = 1, rA(γ) = 2, rB(β) = 1, rB(γ) = 0.9837, rC(β) = 1, and rC(γ) = 1.6. We set all the
remaining weights to be 0. We refer to this CSR instance as I2.
Lemma 9. A variable node Xi holds object α (resp., β) if and only if node X¯i holds object β (resp., α).
Proof. The proof is immediate, since X¯i (resp., Xi) is Xi’s (resp., X¯i’s) nearest node, and both Xi and X¯i
are interested equally in α and β.
Lemma 10. Clause node Ci holds object α if and only if its variable nodes Li,j , for j ∈ {1, 2, 3} hold
object β.
Proof. First, assume that Li,j , for j ∈ {1, 2, 3} hold β. These nodes are Ci’s nearest nodes holding β.
By Lemma 9 we know that nodes L¯i,j , for j ∈ {1, 2, 3} hold α, and they are Ci’s nearest nodes holding α.
Node’sCi cost for holding α and accessing β from Li,j , for j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, is rCi(β)dCiLi,j = 1·1 = 1; while
the cost for holding β and accessing α from L¯i,j , for j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, is rS(α)dCiL¯ij = 0.85 · 1.5 = 1.275.
Obviously, node Ci prefers to replicate α.
Now assume that at least one of the nodes L¯i,j , for j ∈ {1, 2, 3} holds α. These nodes are Ci’s nearest
nodes holding α. Also, by Lemma 9, Ci’s nearest nodes holding β are all the remaining nodes from the set
Li,j , L¯i,j , for j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, that don’t hold α. Node’s Ci cost for holding β and accessing α from Li,j , for
j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, is rCi(α)dCiLi,j = 0.85 · 1 = 0.85; while the cost for holding α and accessing β from node
L¯i,j (resp., Li,j), is rCi(β)dCi ¯Li,j = 1 · 1.5 = 1.5 (resp., rCi(β)dCiLi,j = 1 · 1 = 1). Obviously, in any case
node Ci prefers to replicate β.
Lemma 11. Node S holds object α if and only if all clause nodes C1, . . . , Ck hold object β.
Proof. First, assume that C1, . . . , Ck are holding β. These nodes are S’s nearest nodes holding β. Also by
Lemma 10, S’s nearest node holding α is at least one of Li,j nodes, where i ∈ [1, k], j ∈ {1, 2, 3}. The
cost for S holding α and accessing β from a node Ci, i ∈ [1, k], is rS(β)dSCi = 1 · 2 = 2; while the cost
for holding β and accessing α from Li,j , where i ∈ [1, k], j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, is rS(α)dSLi,j = 0.85 · 3 = 2.55.
Obviously, node S prefers to replicate α.
Now assume that at least one of C1, . . . , Ck holds α. These nodes are S’s nearest node holding α. Also
S’s nearest node holding β, due to Lemma 10 is one of Li,j , where i ∈ [1, k], j ∈ {1, 2, 3}. The cost for
holding β and accessing α from a node Ci, is rS(α)dSCi = 0.85 · 2 = 1.7; while the cost for holding α and
accessing β from a node Lij , where j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, is rS(β)dSLi,j = 1 · 3 = 3. Obviously, in any case node
S prefers to replicate β.
Theorem 12. The CSR instance I1 has an equilibrium if and only if node S holds object α.
Proof. First, assume that S is holding α. By Lemma 11 nodes C1, . . . , Ck hold object β, and by Lemma 10
at least one of nodes Li,j , for j ∈ {1, 2, 3} for each nodeCi, i ∈ [1, k], holds object α, and the corresponding
L¯i,j is holding object β. We claim that the placement where A holds β, B holds β, and C holds α, is a pure
Nash equilibrium. We prove this by showing that none of these nodes wants to deviate from their strategy.
Node A does not want to deviate since its cost for holding object β and accessing α from A’s nearest
node S, is rA(α)dAS = 0.7 · 1 = 0.7; while the cost for holding object α and accessing β from A’s nearest
node B, is rA(α)dAB = 1 · 1 = 1. Node B does not want to deviate since its cost for holding object β and
accessing α from B’s nearest node C, is rB(α)dBC = 1 · 1 = 1; while the cost for holding object α and
accessing β from B’s nearest node A, is rB(β)dBA = 1 · 2 = 2. Node C does not want to deviate since
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its cost for holding object α and accessing β from C’s nearest node A, is rC(β)dCA = 1 · 1 = 1; while the
cost for holding object β and accessing α from C’s nearest node S, is rC(α)dCS = 1 · 2 = 2. Also note that
none of S,C1, . . . , Ck, Lij , L¯ij for i ∈ [1, k], j ∈ {1, 2, 3} is getting affected of the objects been holded by
the gadget nodes.
Now assume that node S holds object β. We are going to prove that for every possible placement over
nodes A, B, and C, at least one node wants to deviate from its strategy. Consider the following cases:
• Nodes A, B, and C hold object α: Node B (resp., C) wants to deviate, since the cost for holding
object α and accessing β from B’s (resp., C’s) nearest node S, is rB(β)dBS = 1 · 3 = 3 (resp.,
rC(β)dCS = 1 · 2 = 2); while the cost for holding object β and accessing α from B’s nearest node
A, is rB(β)dBA = 1 · 2 = 2 (resp., rC(β)dCA = 1 · 1 = 1).
• Two nodes hold object α and the third holds β: In the case where A and B hold α, A wants to deviate
since the cost while holding α and accessing β from A’s nearest node S is rA(β)dAS = 1 · 1 = 1;
while the cost for holding β and accessing α fromA’s nearest nodeB is rA(α)dAB = 0.7·1 = 0.7. In
the case whereA andC hold α, thenC wants to deviate since the cost while holding α and accessing β
from C’s nearest node B is rC(β)dCB = 1 ·2 = 2; while the cost for holding β and accessing α from
C’s nearest node A is rC(α)dCA = 1 · 1 = 1. In the case where B and C hold α, B wants to deviate
since the cost while holding α and accessing β from B’s nearest node A is rB(β)dBA = 1 · 2 = 2;
while the cost for holding β and accessing α from B’s nearest node C is rB(α)dBC = 1 · 1 = 1.
• One node holds α: If A (resp., B, or C) holds α, B (resp., C, A) wants to deviate since the cost
while holding β and accessing α from B’s (resp., C’s, or A’s) nearest node A (resp., B, or C) is
rB(α)dBA = 1 · 2 = 2 (resp., rC(α)dCB = 1 · 2 = 2, or rA(α)dAC = 0.7 · 2 = 1.4); while the
cost for holding α and accessing β from B’s (resp., C’s, or A’s) nearest node C (resp., A, or B), is
rB(β)dBC = 1 · 1 = 1 (resp., rC(β)dCA = 1 · 1 = 1, or rA(β)dAB = 1 · 1 = 1).
• Nodes A, B, and C hold β: All of them want to deviate. Node A wants to deviate since the cost while
holding β and accessing α from A’s nearest node Ci, for some i ∈ [1, k], is rA(β)dACi = 1 · 3 = 3;
while the cost for holding β and accessing α from A’s nearest node S is rA(α)dAS = 0.7 · 1 = 0.7.
Similar proof holds for nodes B and C.
Obviously the system does not have a pure Nash equilibrium, which completes the proof.
Theorem 13. The CSR instance I2 has an equilibrium if and only if node S holds object α.
Proof. First, assume that S is holding α. By Lemma 11 nodes C1, . . . , Ck hold object β, and by Lemma 10
at least one of nodes Li,j , for j ∈ {1, 2, 3} for each nodeCi, i ∈ [1, k], holds object α, and the corresponding
L¯i,j is holding object β. We claim that the placement where A holds γ, node B holds β, and C holds γ
is a pure Nash equilibrium. We prove this by showing that none of these nodes wants to deviate from
their strategy. Node A doesn’t want to deviate since the cost for holding object γ and accessing object α
from node S is rA(α)dAS = 3; while the cost for holding α and accessing γ from node C increases to
rA(γ)dAC = 4. Node B doesn’t want to deviate since the cost for holding object β and accessing object γ
from node C is rB(γ)dBC = 0.9837 · 3.05 = 3.000285; while the cost for holding object β and accessing γ
from the server increases to rB(γ)dsrv = 5. NodeC doesn’t want to deviate since the cost for holding object
γ and accessing β from node B is rC(β)dCB = 3.05; while the cost for holding object β and accessing γ
from node A increases to rC(β)dCA = 3.2.
Now assume that node S holds object β. We are going to prove that for every possible placement over
nodes A, B, and C, at least one node wants to deviate from its strategy. Consider the following cases:
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• Node A holds α, node B holds γ, and node C holds β: Node A wants to deviate since the cost while
it is holding object α and accessing object γ from node B is (rA(γ)dAB = 6.2); while the cost for
holding object γ and accessing α from the server decreases to rA(α)dsrv = 5.
• Node A holds γ, node B holds γ, and node C holds β: Node B wants to deviate since the cost while
it is holding object γ and accessing object β from node C is (rB(β)dBC = 3.05); while the cost for
holding object β and accessing γ from node A decreases to rB(γ)dBA = 3.04947.
• Node A holds γ, node B holds β, and node C holds β: Node C wants to deviate since the cost while
it is holding object β and accessing object γ from node A is (rC(γ)dCA = 3.2); while the cost for
holding object γ and accessing β from node B decreases to rC(β)dCB = 3.05.
• Node A holds γ, node B holds β, and node C holds γ: Node A wants to deviate since the cost while
it is holding object γ and accessing object α from the server is (rA(α)dsrv = 5); while the cost for
holding object α and accessing γ from node C decreases to rA(γ)dAC = 4.
• Node A holds α, node B holds β, and node C holds γ: Node B wants to deviate since the cost while
it is holding object β and accessing object γ from node C is (rB(γ)dBC = 3.000285); while the cost
for holding object γ and accessing β from node S decreases to rB(β)dBS = 3.
• Node A holds α, node B holds γ, and node C holds γ: Node C wants to deviate since the cost while
it is holding object γ and accessing object β from the server is (rC(β)dsrv = 5); while the cost for
holding object β and accessing γ from B decreases to rC(γ)dBC = 4.88.
• Node A holds α, node B holds β, and node C holds β: Node C wants to deviate since the cost while
it is holding object β and accessing object γ from the server is (rC(γ)dsrv = 4.9185); while the cost
for holding object γ and accessing β from node B decreases to rB(β)dCB = 3.05.
• Node A holds γ, node B holds γ, and node C holds γ: Node A wants to deviate since the cost while
it is holding object γ and accessing object α from the server is (rA(α)dsrv = 5); while the cost for
holding object α and accessing γ from C decreases to rA(γ)dAC = 4.
The remaining placements where A holds α, B holds α, and C holds α, obviously are not stable since none
of the nodes are interested in these objects. Since there does not exist a stable placement, an equilibrium
does not exist.
Binary object preferences over three objects.. For the binary object preferences, we introduce two extra
nodes K and L. We set dCiK , for i ∈ [1, k], between clause nodes and K to be 1.4, dSL to be 2.1, and dAS ,
dAB , dBC , dCA to be 1. The server node, which is at access cost dsrv = 10 from all nodes in V , stores a
fixed copy of three objects α, β, and γ. Each node i has a set Si of objects in which it is equally interested.
For nodes Xi, X¯i, for i ∈ [1, n], we set SXi = {α, β} and SX¯i = {α, β}. For nodes Ci, for i ∈ [1, k], we
set SCi = {α, γ}. For node K we set SK = {γ}; while for node L we set SL = {β}. For node S we set
SS = {α, β}. For nodes A, B, and C we set SA, SB , and SC correspondingly to be the set {α, γ}. As we
mentioned in the binary object preference definition for our utility function Us(i), equally interested means
weight 1 for all objects in Si, and 0 for the remaining. We refer to this instance as I3.
Lemma 9 holds as it is for the binary object preferences directed case.
Lemma 14. Clause node Ci holds object α if and only if its variable nodes Li,j , for j ∈ {1, 2, 3} hold
object β.
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Proof. First, assume that Li,j , for j ∈ {1, 2, 3} hold β. By Lemma 9 we know that nodes L¯i,j , for j ∈
{1, 2, 3} hold α, and they are Ci’s nearest nodes holding α; while Ci’s nearest node holding γ is node K.
Node’s Ci cost for holding α and accessing γ from K is dCiK = 1.4; while the cost for holding γ and
accessing α from L¯i,j , for j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, is dCiL¯ij = 1.5. Obviously, node Ci prefers to replicate α.
Now assume that at least one of the nodes L¯i,j , for j ∈ {1, 2, 3} holds α. These nodes are Ci’s nearest
nodes holding α; while again Ci’s nearest node holding γ is node K. Node’s Ci cost for holding γ and
accessing α from Li,j , for j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, is dCiLi,j = 1; while the cost for holding α and accessing γ from
node K is dCiK = 1.4. Obviously, node Ci prefers to replicate γ.
Lemma 15. Node S holds object α if and only if all clause nodes C1, . . . , Ck hold object γ.
Proof. First, assume that C1, . . . , Ck are holding γ. By Lemma 14, S’s nearest node holding α is at least
one of Li,j nodes, where i ∈ [1, k], j ∈ {1, 2, 3}; while S’s nearest nodes holding β is node L. The cost for
S holding α and accessing β from node L, is dSL = 2.1; while the cost for holding β and accessing α from
Li,j , where i ∈ [1, k], j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, is dSLi,j = 3. Obviously, node S prefers to replicate α.
Now assume that at least one of C1, . . . , Ck holds α. These nodes are S’s nearest node holding α; while
again S’s nearest node holding β is L. The cost for holding β and accessing α from a node Ci, is dSCi = 2;
while the cost for holding α and accessing β from a node L is dSL = 2.1. Obviously, node S prefers to
replicate β.
Theorem 16. There exists an equilibrium for the CSR instance I3 if and only if node S holds object α.
Proof. First, assume that S is holding α. By Lemma 15 nodes C1, . . . , Ck hold object γ, and by Lemma 14
at least one of nodes Li,j , for j ∈ {1, 2, 3} for each nodeCi, i ∈ [1, k], holds object α, and the corresponding
L¯i,j is holding object β. We claim that the placement where A holds γ, B holds γ, and C holds α, is a pure
Nash equilibrium. We prove this by showing that none of these nodes wants to deviate from their strategy.
Node A does not want to deviate since its cost for holding object γ and accessing α from A’s nearest
node S, is dAS = 1; while the cost for holding object α and accessing γ from A’s nearest node B, is still
dAB = 1. Node B does not want to deviate since its cost for holding object γ and accessing α from B’s
nearest node C, is dBC = 1; while the cost for holding object α and accessing γ from B’s nearest node A,
is still dBA = 1. Node C does not want to deviate since its cost for holding object α and accessing γ from
C’s nearest node A, is dCA = 1; while the cost for holding object γ and accessing α from C’s nearest node
S, is still dCS = 1. Also note that none of S,C1, . . . , Ck, Lij , L¯ij for i ∈ [1, k], j ∈ {1, 2, 3} is getting
affected of the objects been holded by the gadget nodes.
Now assume that node S holds object β. We are going to prove that for every possible placement over
nodes A, B, and C, at least one node wants to deviate from its strategy. Consider the following cases:
• Nodes A, B, and C hold object α: Node B (resp., C) wants to deviate, since the cost for holding
object α and accessing γ from B’s (resp., C’s) nearest node Ci, for some i ∈ [1, k] or from node K,
is dBCi = 5 or dBK = 6.4 (resp., dCCi = 4 or dCK = 5.4); while the cost for holding object γ and
accessing α from B’s nearest node A, is dBA = 2 (resp., dCA = 1).
• Two nodes hold object α and the third holds γ: In the case where A and B hold α, A wants to deviate
since the cost while holding α and accessing γ from A’s nearest node C is dAC = 2; while the cost
for holding γ and accessing α from A’s nearest node B is dAB = 1. The other cases are symmetric.
• One node holds α: If A holds α, B wants to deviate since the cost while holding γ and accessing α
from B’s nearest node A is dBA = 2; while the cost for holding α and accessing γ from B’s nearest
node C, is dBC = 1. The other cases are symmetric.
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• Nodes A, B, and C hold γ: All of them want to deviate. Node A wants to deviate since the cost while
holding γ and accessing α from A’s nearest node Ci, for some i ∈ [1, k], is dACi = 3; while the cost
for holding α and accessing γ from A’s nearest node B is dAB = 1. The other cases are symmetric.
Obviously the system does not have a pure Nash equilibrium, which completes the proof.
We now show that φ is satisfiable if and only if the above CSR games (both undirected and directed
cases) (resp., for the binary object preferences, directed case) has a pure Nash equilibrium. Suppose that φ
is satisfiable and consider a satisfying assignment for φ. If the assignment of a variable xi is True, then we
replicate object α in cache of variable node Xi; otherwise, we replicate object β. By Lemma 9 we know
that a variable node Xi holds object α (resp., β) if and only if node X¯i holds object β (resp., α). In this
way we keep the consistency between truth assignment of a variable and its negation. By Lemma 10 (resp.,
Lemma 14) we know that a clause node Ci, will replicate object β (resp., γ) if and only if at least one of its
variable nodes, holds object α. From above, any clause node Ci will hold object β (resp., γ) only if at least
one of clause ci literals is True. By Lemma 11 (resp., Lemma 15), we know that node S, will replicate object
α if and only if all clause nodes C1, . . . , Ck are holding object β (resp., γ). Thus, node S replicates object α
only if all clauses c1, . . . , ck are True. By Theorems 12 and 13 (resp., 16), we know that there exists a pure
Nash Equilibrium if and only if object β is stored to node S; thus, there exists a pure Nash Equilibrium if
and only if all clauses are True. This gives our proof.
6.2 Binary preferences over two objects
Consider the problem 2BIN: does a given CSR instance with two objects and binary preferences possess
an equilibrium? We prove that 2BIN is polynomial-time equivalent to the notorious EVEN-CYCLE prob-
lem [34]: does a given digraph contain an even cycle? Despite intensive efforts, the complexity of the
problem EVEN-CYCLE was open until [23, 29] provided a tour de force polynomial-time algorithm. Our
result thus also places 2BIN in P.
Theorem 17. EVEN-CYCLE is polynomial-time equivalent to 2BIN.
We prove the polynomial-time equivalence of 2BIN and EVEN-CYCLE by a series of reductions.
We first show the equivalence between 2BIN and 2DIR-BIN, which is the sub-class of 2BIN instances
in which the node preferences are specified by an unweighted directed graph (henceforth digraph); in a
2DIR-BIN instance, we are given a digraph, and the preference of a node for the other nodes increases with
decreasing distance in the graph.
Lemma 18. 2BIN is polynomial-time equivalent to 2DIR-BIN.
Proof. Given a 2BIN instance I with node set V , two objects, node preference relations {≥i: i ∈ V },
and interest sets {Si : i ∈ V }, we construct a 2DIR-BIN instance I ′ with the same node set, objects, and
interest sets, but with the node preference relations specified by an unweighted digraph G. Our construction
will ensure that any equilibrium in I is an equilibrium in I ′ and vice-versa. For distinct nodes i and j, we
have an edge from i to j if and only if j is a most i-preferred node in V \ {i}. We now argue that I has
an equilibrium if and only if I ′ has an equilibrium. A placement for I is an equilibrium if and only if the
following holds for each node i: (a) if |Si| = 1, then i holds the lone object in Si; (b) if |Si| = 2, then the
object not held by i is at an i-most preferred node. Similarly, any equilibrium placement for I ′ satisfies the
following condition for each i: (a) if |Si| = 1, then i holds the lone object in Si; (b) if |Si| = 2, then the
object not held by i is at a neighbor of i. By our construction of the instances, equilibria of I are equilibria
of I ′ and vice-versa.
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We next define EXACT-2DIR-BIN, which is the subclass of 2DIR-BIN games where each node is
interested in both objects; thus, an EXACT-2DIR-BIN instance is completely specified by a digraph G.
We say that a node i is stable in a given placement P if Pi is a best response to P−i. We say that an
EXACT-2DIR-BIN instance G is stable (resp., 1-critical) if there exists a placement in which all nodes
(resp., all nodes except at most one) are stable. Since each node has unit cache capacity, each placement is a
2-coloring of the nodes: think of a node as colored by the object it holds in its cache. Given a placement, an
arc is said to be bichromatic if its head and tail have different colors. Note that for any EXACT-2DIR-BIN
instance, a node is stable in a placement iff it has a bichromatic outgoing arc.
Lemma 19. 2DIR-BIN and EXACT-2DIR-BIN are polynomial-time equivalent on general digraphs.
Proof. Since EXACT-2DIR-BIN games are a special subclass of 2DIR-BIN games, we only need to show
that 2DIR-BIN games reduce to EXACT-2DIR-BIN games. Given an instance of a 2DIR-BIN game,
we need to handle the nodes that are interested in at most one object. First, note that we can remove the
outgoing arcs from all such nodes. Let V0 consist of the nodes with no objects of interest. For each node
u in V0 we add a new node u0 to V0 along with arcs (u, u0) and (u0, u). Let red and blue denote the two
objects. Let Vr and Vb denote the set of nodes interested in red and blue, respectively. Without loss of
generality, let |Vr| ≥ |Vb|. Add |Vr| − |Vb| additional nodes to the set Vb (so that |Vr| = |Vb|) and connect
all the nodes in Vr
⋃
Vb with a directed cycle that alternates strictly between Vr nodes and Vb nodes. The
rest of the network is kept the same and all the nodes are set to have interest in both objects. Now, if the
original instance is stable then we can stabilize the new instance by having each node in Vr (resp., Vb) cache
the red (resp., blue) object, the nodes in V0 cache any object (so long as an original node u and its associated
node u0 store complementary objects) and the other nodes cache the same object as in the placement that
made the original instance stable. And in the other direction, if the transformed instance is stable then in an
equilibrium placement, the nodes in Vr must each store an object of one color while each node in Vb stores
the object of the other color. By renaming the colors, if necessary, we get a stable coloring (placement) for
the original instance.
For completeness, we next present some standard graph-theoretic terminology that we will use in our
proof. A digraph is said to be weakly connected if it is possible to get from a node to any other by following
arcs without paying heed to the direction of the arcs. A digraph is said to be strongly connected if it is
possible to get from a node to any other by a directed path. We will use the following well-known structure
result about digraphs: a general digraph that is weakly connected is a directed acyclic graph on the unique
set of maximal strongly connected (node-disjoint) components. We will also use the following strengthening
of the folklore ear-decomposition of strongly connected digraphs [30]:
Lemma 20. An ear-decomposition can be obtained starting with any cycle of a strongly connected digraph.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose not, then consider a subgraph with a maximal ear-decomposition
obtainable from the cycle in question. If it is not the entire digraph then consider any arc leaving the sub-
graph. Note that the digraph is strongly connected and hence such an arc must exist. Further, note that every
arc in a digraph is contained in a cycle since there is a directed path from the head of the arc to the tail.
Starting from the arc follow this cycle until it intersects the subgraph again, as it must because it ends at the
tail which lies in the subgraph. This forms an ear that contradicts the maximality of the decomposition.
Lemma 21. EVEN-CYCLE on strongly connected digraphs and EVEN-CYCLE on general digraphs
are polynomial-time equivalent.
Proof. Since strongly connected digraphs are a special subclass of general digraphs it suffices to show that
EVEN-CYCLE on general digraphs can be reduced to EVEN-CYCLE on strongly connected digraphs.
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Remember that a general digraph has a unique set of maximal strongly connected components that are dis-
joint and computable in polynomial-time. Further any cycle, including even cycles, must lie entirely within
a strongly connected component. Thus a digraph possesses an even cycle iff one of its strongly connected
components does. Hence it follows that EVEN-CYCLE on general digraphs reduces to EVEN-CYCLE
on strongly connected digraphs.
Lemma 22. EVEN-CYCLE and EXACT-2DIR-BIN games are polynomial-time equivalent on strongly
connected digraphs.
Proof. To show the polynomial-time equivalence, we show that a strongly connected digraph is stable iff
it has an even cycle. One direction is easy. If the digraph is stable then consider the placement in which
every node is stable. So every node has a bichromatic outgoing arc; by starting at any node and following
outgoing bichromatic edges we will eventually loop back on ourselves. The loop so obtained is the required
even cycle; it is even because it is composed of bichromatic arcs. In the other direction, if there is an
even cycle then we take the ear-decomposition starting with that cycle (Lemma 20), stabilize that cycle
(by making each arc bichromatic since it is of even cardinality) and then stabilize each node in each ear by
working backwards along the ear.
Lemma 23. Any EXACT-2DIR-BIN game on a strongly connected digraph is 1-critical.
Proof. Consider an ear-decomposition of the strongly connected digraph starting with a cycle. Observe that
all but at most one node of the cycle can be stabilized by arbitrarily assigning one color to a node, and then
assigning alternate colors to the nodes as we progress along the cycle. Every node in the cycle, other than
possibly the initial node, is stable. The rest of the digraph can be stabilized ear by ear, stabilizing each
ear by working backwards from the point of attachment. Hence, all but one node of the digraph can be
stabilized.
Lemma 24. EXACT-2DIR-BIN on general digraphs is polynomial-time equivalent to EXACT-2DIR-BIN
on strongly connected digraphs.
Proof. Since strongly connected digraphs are a subclass of general digraphs we need only show that the
problem EXACT-2DIR-BIN on general digraphs reduces to EXACT-2DIR-BIN on strongly connected
digraphs. A general digraph is stable iff all of its weakly connected components are. A weakly connected
component is a directed acyclic graph (dag) on the strongly connected components. It is clear that a weakly
connected component cannot be stabilized if any one of the strongly connected components that is a minimal
element of the directed acyclic graph cannot be stabilized. Interestingly, the converse is also true. If all of
the strongly connected components that are minimal elements of the dag can be stabilized then the entire
weakly connected component can be stabilized because each of the other strongly connected components
has at least one outgoing arc which is used to stabilize its tail while the rest of the strongly connected
component can be stabilized because strongly connected components are 1-critical by Lemma 23. We can
determine such a stable placement by processing the strongly connected components in topologically sorted
order (according to the dag) starting from the minimal elements. Thus a digraph is stable iff every strongly
connected component that is a minimal element is stable. Hence, EXACT-2DIR-BIN on general digraphs
is reducible in polynomial-time to strongly connected digraphs.
7 Fractional replication games
We introduce a new class of capacitated replication games where nodes can store fractions of objects, as
opposed to whole objects, and satisfy an object access request by retrieving enough fractions that make up
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the whole object. Rather than associate different identities with different fractions of a given object, we view
each portion of an object as being fungible, thus allowing any set of fractions of an object, adding up to at
least one, to constitute the whole object. Such fractional replication scenarios naturally arise when objects
are encoded and distributed within a network to permit both efficient and reliable access.
Several implementations of fractional replication, in fact, already exist. For instance, fountain codes [4,
31] and the information dispersal algorithm [28] present two ways of encoding an object as a number of
smaller pieces – of size, say 1/m fraction of the full object size, where m is an integer – such that the full
object may be reconstructed from any m of the pieces. A natural formalization is to view each object as a
polynomial of high degree, and consider each piece of the object as the evaluation of the polynomial on a
random point in a suitable large field. Then, accessing an object is equivalent (with very high probability)
to accessing a sufficient number of pieces of the object.
We now present fractional capacitated selfish replication (F-CSR) games, which are an adaptation of the
game-theoretic framework developed in Section 4 to fractional replication. We have a set V of nodes sharing
a set O of objects. In an F-CSR game, the strategies are fractional placements; a fractional placement P˜ is
a |V |-tuple {P˜i : i ∈ V } where P˜i : O → < under the constraint that sum of P˜i(α), over all α in O, is at
most the cache size of i.
We begin by presenting F-CSR games in the special case of sum utilities, where the generalization from
the integral to the fractional setting is most natural. For sum utilities, recall that we are given a cost function
d and node-object weights ri(α), i ∈ V , α ∈ O. Given a fractional global placement P˜ , we define the cost
incurred by i for accessing object α as the minimum value of xjdij under the constraints that
∑
j xj = 1
and xj ≤ P˜j(α) for all j. Then, the total cost incurred by i is the sum, over all objects α, of ri(α) times the
cost incurred by i for accessing α. For a given fractional global placement P˜ , the utility of i is the negative
of the total cost incurred by i under P˜ .
We now consider F-CSR games under the more general setting of utility preference relations. As
before, each node i has a node preference relation ≥i and a preference relation i among global (integral)
placements. Recall that the node and placement preference relations of each node i induce a preorder wi
among the elements of O × (V \ {i}) (see Section 4). For F-CSR games, we require the existence of a
total preorder wi, for all i. We now specify the best response function for each player for a given fractional
global placement P˜ . For each node i and object α, we determine the assignment µ
i,P˜ ,α
: V \ {i} →
< that is lexicographically minimal under the node preference relation ≥i subject to the condition that
µ
i,P˜ ,α
≤ P˜k(α) for each k and
∑
k µi,P˜ ,α(k) = 1. We next compute bi,P˜ : O × (V \ {i}) → < to be
the lexicographically maximal assignment under wi subject to the condition that bi,P˜ (α, k) ≤ µi,P˜ ,α(k) for
all k and
∑
α,k bi,P˜ (α, k) is at most the size of i’s cache. The best response of a player i is then to store∑
k bi,P˜ (α, k) of α in their cache. This completes the definition of F-CSR games.
Using standard fixed-point machinery, we show that every F-CSR game has an equilibrium. We also
show that finding equilibria in F-CSR games is PPAD-complete.
Theorem 25. Every F-CSR instance has a pure Nash equilibrium. Finding an equilibrium in an F-CSR
game is PPAD-complete.
We prove Theorem 25 by establishing separately the existence of equilibria, membership in PPAD, and
the PPAD-hardness of finding equilibria.
7.1 Existence of equilibria
Theorem 26. Every F-CSR instance has a pure Nash equilibrium.
Proof. By [25], a game has a pure Nash equilibrium if the strategy space of each player is a compact,
non-empty, convex space, and the payoff function of each player is continuous on the strategy space of all
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players and quasi-concave in the strategy space of the player. In an F-CSR instance, the strategy space of
each player i is simply the set of all its fractional placements: that is, the set of functions f : O → [0, 1]
subject to condition that
∑
α∈O f(α) ≤ ci, where ci is the cache size of the node (player). The strategy set
thus is clearly convex, non-empty, and compact. Furthermore, as defined above, the payoff for any player i
under fractional placement P˜ is simply the solution to the following linear program:
max−
∑
α∈O
ri(α)(
∑
j∈V
xij(α)dij)∑
j∈V
xij(α) = 1 for all i ∈ V, α ∈ O
xij(α) ≤ P˜j(α) for all i, j ∈ V, α ∈ O
xij(α) ≥ 0 for all i, j ∈ V, α ∈ O
It is easy to see that the payoff function is both continuous in the placements of all players, and quasi-concave
in the strategy space of player i, thus completing the proof of the theorem.
7.2 Membership in PPAD
Theorem 27. Finding an equilibrium in an F-CSR game is in PPAD.
Proof. Our proof is by a reduction from FSPP (Fractional Stable Paths Problem), which is defined as fol-
lows [15]. Let G be a graph with a distinguished destination node d. Each node v 6= d has a list pi(v) of
simple paths from v to d and a preference relation ≥v among the paths in pi(v). For a path S, we also define
pi(v, S) to be the set of paths in pi(v) that have S as a suffix. A proper suffix S of P is a suffix of P such
that S 6= P and S 6= ∅. A feasible fractional paths solution is a set w = {wv : v 6= d} of assignments
wv : pi(v) → [0, 1] satisfying: (1) Unity condition: for each node v,
∑
P∈pi(v)wv(P ) ≤ 1, and (2) Tree
condition: for each node v, and each path S with start node u,
∑
P∈pi(v,S)wv(P ) ≤ wu(S).
In other words, a feasible solution is one in which each node chooses at most 1 unit of flow to d such
that no suffix is filled by more than the amount of flow placed on that suffix by its starting node. A fea-
sible solution w is stable if for any node v and path Q starting at v, one of the following holds: (S1)∑
P∈pi(v)wv(P ) = 1, and for each P in pi(v) with wv(P ) > 0, P ≥v Q; or (S2) There exists a proper suffix
S of Q such that
∑
P∈pi(v,S)wv(P ) = wu(S), where u is the start node of S, and for each P ∈ pi(v, S) with
wv(P ) > 0, P ≥v Q.
Given an F-CSR G with node set V , object set O, node preference relations ≥i for i ∈ V , and utility
preference relations i for i ∈ V , we construct an instance I of FSPP as follows. For nodes i, j ∈ V and
object α ∈ O, we introduce the following FSPP vertices.
• hold(i, α) representing the amount of α that node i will store in its cache.
• serve(i, j, α) representing the amount of α that node j will serve for i given a placement for V \ {i}.
• serve’(i, j, α), an auxiliary vertex needed for serve(i, j, α).
• serve(i, α), representing the amount of α that other nodes will serve for i given a placement for V \{i}.
• hold(i), representing the best response of i give the placement of other nodes.
• hold’(i, α), an auxiliary vertex needed for hold(i, α).
We now present the path sets and preferences for each vertex of the FSPP instance.
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• serve(i, α): the path set includes all paths of the form 〈serve(i, α), hold(j, α), d〉, and serve(i, α)
prefers 〈serve(i, α), hold(j, α), d〉 over 〈serve(i, α), hold(k, α), d〉 if j ≥i k.
• serve’(i, j, α): the path set includes all paths of the form 〈serve’(i, j, α), serve(i, α), hold(j, α), d〉
and the direct path 〈serve’(i, j, α), d〉. For the preference order, serve’(i, j, α) prefers all paths
〈serve’(i, j, α), serve(i, α), hold(j, α), d〉 equally, and all of them over the direct path.
• serve(i, j, α): the path set includes the path 〈serve’(i, j, α), d〉 and the direct path 〈serve(i, j, α), d〉
with a higher preference for the former path.
• hold(i): the path set includes paths of the form 〈hold(i), serve(i, j, α), d〉, and hold(i) prefers the path
〈hold(i), serve(i, j, α), d〉 over 〈hold(i), serve(i, k, β), d〉 if (j, α) wi (k, β).
• hold’(i, α): the path set includes paths of the form 〈hold’(i, α), hold(i), serve(i, j, α), d〉 all of which
are preferred equally, and the direct path 〈hold’(i, α), d〉 which is preferred the least.
• hold(i, α): the path set includes two paths 〈hold’(i, α), d〉 and the direct path with a higher preference
for the former path.
We now show that the F-CSR instance has an equilibrium if and only if the FSPP instance has an
equilibrium. Our proof is by giving a mapping f from global fractional placements in the F-CSR instance
to feasible solutions in the FSPP instance such that (a) if P˜ is an equilibrium for the F-CSR instance, then
f(P˜ ) is an equilibrium for the FSPP instance, and (b) if w is an equilibrium for the FSPP instance, then
f−1(w) is an equilibrium for the F-CSR instance.
Let P˜ denote any fractional placement of the F-CSR instance. We now define the solution f(P˜ ) of the
FSPP instance. In f(P˜ ) vertex hold(i, α) plays P˜i(α) on the direct path and 1− P˜i(α) on the other path in
its path set, for every i in V and α in O. The remaining vertices play their best responses, considered in the
following order. First, consider vertices of the form serve(i, α). In the best response, the amount played by
serve(i, α) on the path 〈serve(i, α), hold(j, α), d〉, equals µ
i,P˜ ,α
(j); recall that µ
i,P˜ ,α
(j) is is the assignment
that is lexicographically minimal under the node preference relation≥i subject to the condition that µi,P˜ ,α ≤
P˜k(α) for each k and
∑
k µi,P˜ ,α(k) = 1. We next consider the vertices of the form serve’(i, j, α). In its best
response, vertex serve’(i, j, α) plays µ
i,P˜ ,α
(j) on the path 〈serve’(i, j, α), serve(i, α), hold(j, α), d〉. Next,
in its best response, vertex serve(i, j, α) plays µ
i,P˜ ,α
(j) on its direct path and 1−µ
i,P˜ ,α
(j) on its remaining
path. We now consider the best response of vertex hold(i); it distributes its unit among paths of the form
〈hold(i), serve(i, j, α), d〉 (for all j in V \ {i} and α in O) lexicographically maximally under the total
preorder wi over node-object pairs. That is, hold(i) plays bi,P˜ (α, j) on the path 〈hold(i), serve(i, j, α), d〉.
We next consider the best response of the vertex hold’(i, α); it plays 1−∑j bi,P˜ (α, j) on its direct path and
b
i,P˜
(α, j) on the path 〈hold’(i, α), hold(i), serve(i, j, α), d〉. This completes the definition of the solution
f(P˜ ).
We now argue that if P˜ is an equilibrium so is f(P˜ ). By construction, every vertex other than of the
form hold(i, α) play their best responses in f(P˜ ). We next show that i plays a best response in P˜ if and
only if the vertices hold(i, α) play their best response in f(P˜ ). The best response of hold(i, α) is to play
1 −∑j bi,P˜ (α, j) on the path 〈hold(i, α), hold’(i, α), d〉 and the ∑j bi,P˜ (α, j) on its direct path. The best
response of i in P˜ is to set P˜i(α) to
∑
j bi,P˜ (α, j). Thus if P˜ is an equilibrium, then so is f(P˜ ). Furthermore,
if w is an equilibrium, by definition of f , P˜ = f−1(w) is well-defined. Since the best responses of i and
the vertices hold(i, α) are consistent, P˜ is also an equilibrium. This completes the reduction from F-CSR
to FSPP, placing F-CSR in PPAD.
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7.3 PPAD-Hardness
This section is devoted to the proof of the following theorem.
Theorem 28. The problem of finding an equilibrium in F-CSR games is PPAD-hard even when the under-
lying cost function d is a metric.
Our reduction is from preference games [15]. Given a preference game G with n players 1, 2, . . . , n
and their preferences given by ≥i, we construct an F-CSR game Ĝ as follows. The game Ĝ has a set
V of n2 + 3n players numbered 1 through n2 + 3n, and a set O of 2n objects α1, . . . , α2n. We set the
utility function for each node to be the sum utility function, thus ensuring that the desired monotonicity and
consistency conditions are satisfied.
We next present the metric cost function d over the nodes. We group the players into four sets V1 =
{i : 1 ≤ i ≤ n}, V2 = {i · n + j : 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ n}, V3 = {n2 + n + i : 1 ≤ i ≤ n}, and
V4 = {n2 + 2n + i : 1 ≤ i ≤ n}. For each node i in V1 and j in V3, we set dii = 2 and dij = 4. We
set dn2+n+i,n2+2n+i = 3. For each node i in V1 and k = i · n + j, we set dik as follows: if j >i i then
dij equals 6 − `/n when j is the `th most preferred player for i; if i ≥i j, then dij equals 1. All the other
distances are obtained by using metric properties.
We finally specify the object weights. For k ∈ V1, we set rk(αi) = 1 for all i 6= k such that i ≥k k; we
set rk(αk) = 2.5 such that 4 < 2rk(αk) ≤ 5. For node k = i · n + j in V2, we set rk(αj) = 1. For node
k = n2 + n + i in V3, we set rk(αi) = rk(αi+n) = 1. Finally, for node k = n2 + 2n + i in V4, we set
rk(αi+n) = 1.
Given a placement P for Ĝ, we define a solution ω(P ) = {wij} for the preference game G: wij =
Pi(αj). The following lemma immediately follows from the definition of Ĝ.
Lemma 29. The following statements hold for any placement P for Ĝ.
• For k = i · n+ j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, Pk is a best response to P−k if and only if Pk(αj) = 1.
• For k = n2 + n+ i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, Pk is a best response to P−k if and only if Pk(αn+i) = 1.
• For k = n2 + n+ i, Pk is a best response to P−k if and only if Pk(αi) = 1− Pi(αi) and Pk(αn+i =
Pi(αi).
Lemma 30. Let P be a placement for Ĝ in which every node not in V1 plays their best response. Then, the
best response of a node i in V1 is the lexicographically maximum (Pi(αj1), Pi(αj2), . . . , Pi(αjn)), where
j1 ≥i j2 ≥i · · · ≥i jn, subject to the constraint that Pi(αj) ≤ Pj(αj) for j 6= i.
Proof. Fix a node i in V1. By Lemma 29, node i ·n+ j holds object j, for 1 ≤ j ≤ n; each of these nodes is
at distance at least 5 and at most 6 away from i. By Lemma 29, for every node k = n2 + n+ j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n,
Pk(αj) = 1− Pj(αj) and Pk(αn+j) = Pj(αj).
We now consider the best response of node i. We first note that for any j ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {i} such that
i ≥i j, Pi(αj) = 0 since the nearest full copy of αj is nearer than the nearest node holding any fraction
of object αi. Let S denote the set of j such that j ≥i i. For any j in S \ {i}, Pi(αj) ≤ Pj(αj) since
node n2 + n + j at distance 5 holds 1 − Pj(αj) fraction of αj , the nearest node holding any fraction of
αi is at distance 4, and 4ri(αi) > 5ri(αj). Furthermore, for any j, k in S if j >i k, then the farthest
Pj(αj) fraction of αj is farther than the farthest Pk(αk) fraction of αk, implying that in the best response, if
Pi(αj) < Pj(αj) then Pi(αk) = 0. Thus, the best response of i is the unique lexicographically maximum
solution (Pi(αj1), Pi(αj2), . . . , Pi(αjn)), where j1 ≥i j2 ≥i · · · ≥i jn, subject to the constraint that
Pi(αj) ≤ Pj(αj) for j 6= i.
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Lemma 31. A placement P is an equilibrium for Ĝ if and only if ω(P ) is a equilibrium for G and every
node not in V1 plays their best response in P .
Proof. Consider an equilibrium placement P for Ĝ Clearly, every node plays their best response. We now
prove that ω(P ) is an equilibrium for G. Fix a node i in V1. By Lemma 30, the best response of i is the
unique lexicographically maximum solution (Pi(αj1), Pi(αj2), . . . , Pi(αjn)), where j1 ≥i j2 ≥i · · · ≥i jn,
subject to the constraint that Pi(αj) ≤ Pj(αj) for j 6= i. Since this applies to every node i, it is immediate
from the definitions of ω(P ) and preference games that if P is an equilibrium for Ĝ then ω(P ) is an
equilibrium for G.
We now consider the reverse direction. Suppose we have a placement P in which every player not in
V1 plays their best response and ω(P ) is an equilibrium for the preference game G. By Lemma 30 and the
definition of ω(P ), the best response of i in G matches that in the F-CSR game; hence every player in V1
also plays their best response in P , implying that P is an equilibrium for Ĝ.
The construction of Ĝ from G is clearly polynomial time. Furthermore, given any equilibrium for Ĝ,
an equilibrium for G can be constructed in linear time. We thus have a reduction from a PPAD-complete
problem to F-CSR implying that the latter is PPAD-hard, thus completing the proof of Theorem 28.
8 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have defined integral and fractional selfish replication games (CSR and F-CSR) in net-
works, where the cache capacity of each node is bounded and all objects are of uniform size. We have
shown that a pure Nash equilibrium can be computed for every hierarchical network, using a new notion of
fictional players. In general, we have almost completely characterized the complexity of CSR games: For
what classes of games do equilibria exist? Can we determine efficiently whether they exist? When they
do exist, can we efficiently find them? One complexity question that is still open is the case of undirected
networks with binary preferences. We conjecture that finding equilbria in such games (which we prove
are potential games) is PLS-hard. In general, we would like to study the convergence of the best response
process for the cases of games where equilibria exist.
We showed that F-CSR games always have equilibria, though they may be hard to find. It is not hard to
argue that an equilibrium in the corresponding integral variant is an equilibrium in the fractional instance.
So whenever an “integral” equilibrium can be determined efficiently, so can a “fractional” equilibrium. An
interesting direction of research is to identify other special cases of fractional games where equilibria may
be efficiently determined. We also note that our proof of existence of equilibria in F-CSR games, currently
presented for the case of unit-size objects, extends to arbitrary object sizes.
Finally, we note that our model assumes that the sets of nodes, objects, and preference relations are all
static. We believe our results will be meaningful for environments where these sets change infrequently. De-
veloping better models for addressing more dynamic scenarios is an important practical research direction.
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